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The tribunal later tried him for war crimes. The charges facing Erdemovic were not unusual for his crimes, one count of a crime against humanity and an alternative count of a violation of the laws or customs of war. 3 What was unusual was how his trial would unfold.
Erdemovic, a mere boy when compared to most tribunal detainees, was just 23 years old when he committed his crimes. 4 Ordered by superiors, he executed between 70 to 100 Bosnian Muslim men. 5 The killing occurred at a farm near Pilica. 6 It was to this farm the Bosnian Serb military or police personnel bused men who had earlier surrendered to the police or military authorities. 7 Upon arrival, Serbs herded them into a field adjacent to a farm building. 8 The victims were forced to stand up in a row with their backs facing Drazen Erdemovic and members of the 10 th Sabotage Detachment. 9 The men standing in line ranged in age from 17 to 60. Upon order, Erdemovic and his unit killed them. 10 From that day alone, the summary executions numbered more than one thousand.
There are no words to describe the horror and tragedy ofthat scene. Yet out of this barbarism came an unexpected and fortunate turn of events that led Erdemovic to confession and a change in international war crimes procedure. The crime was committed under duress. Erdemovic faced the credible threat of his own death if he failed to follow his superior's orders. 12 According to Erdemovic's own account, they would have lined 14 Eventually, Erdemovic would plead guilty to a war crime. In return the prosecutor would drop the charge alleging a crime against humanity.
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These events were unprecedented. The Erdemovic plea developed into more than recognition of his efforts at reform, his deep remorse or his feelings of guilt. It became more than a chance to get critical testimony leading to the indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. 16 This trial marked the first time ever, 17 an accused pled guilty before
Tribunal confirmed the agreement's not so subtle influence by announcing, "the Trial Chamber has taken [the plea agreement] into careful consideration in determining the sentence to be imposed upon the accused."
The developments of the Erdemovic case stand in stark contrast to discussions about the tribunal's procedure rules. The tribunal talked about plea bargains and immunity during the negotiations for its procedural rules, and then specifically rejected them. The President stated, " [t] he persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhumane acts. After due reflection we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be." This statement ignored the difficulty they would later encounter prosecuting these crimes. It discounted how the "collaboration" of one person, like Erdemovic, might provide "details of four incidents of which they did not previously know."
In reality, the tribunal did not want to be seen cutting deals with vial criminals.
Nor could they justify reducing the penalties of people who tortured, sexually assaulted and murdered innocent humans. It was ironic how this perspective obscured the pleabargain's future value to the tribunal. The judges and diplomats did not foresee how Erdemovic' case would help them deter future atrocities. Nor did they perceive how new evidence would help prosecutors publicly indict major war criminals who were otherwise untouchable. In contrast to the tribunal's expectations, Erdemovic's culpability was much less than they expected, and unlike most criminals, he showed profound remorse for his crimes. 30 Under these conditions, the tribunal would soon be compelled to accept the otherwise unthinkable.
The tribunal rejected plea-bargaining for other reasons too. One primary rationale can be seen in the fundamental purposes of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgments passed down to the Yugoslavia tribunal. Countries participating at Nuremberg based their trials upon the principle of individual responsibility. 31 Nuremberg hoped that by holding individual perpetrators responsible, they would relieve the collective national guilt. They wanted to remove the blame cast upon nations, forcing survivors to condemn individual perpetrators for the atrocities. 33 No doubt, Nuremberg intended its verdicts and its methods to contribute to lasting peace among the warring countries. This too seemed an essential purpose for Yugoslavia, whose warring factions divided along racial and ethnic lines. Ironically, the tribunal would promote both accountability and peace through pleabargaining.
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Clouded by these Nuremberg perceptions, the Yugoslavian tribunal found it hard to accept any concept perceived as diminishing personal responsibility. They believed injecting plea-bargaining into the trial process would do just that. Agreements could ostensibly deal away individual responsibility. individual crimes in exchange for some non-concrete benefit to society as a whole, such as a possibly less costly trial or the possibility of convicting another criminal. It seemed too high a price to pay at the time. They were not forewarned how enticing the benefit to society could be and how pitiful an accused might appear. Yet in time, the tribunal would accept plea-bargaining to achieve their goals, and they would also come to see how it could promote justice.
It took a compelling case to make this shift in thinking. Erdemovic was the essence of a sympathetic character. He, himself was, after all, somewhat of a victim of circumstances -forced to commit a crime he abhorred. The tribunal was so moved by the facts of his case that they finally sentenced him to fewer years than both he and the prosecutor had agreed upon. It seems everyone involved felt the tribunal had rendered the right punishment. Still some might question whether this was the right procedure to use and whether plea-bargaining was necessary or legal at all.
This article explores these issues in the context of international law. It questions whether the procedure of plea-bargaining is proper for international tribunals. Specifically it looks to see if there is any basis in international law for applying plea-bargaining to international tribunals. It questions whether or not the unique circumstances of international tribunals make plea-bargaining well suited for international trials. Finally, it inquires how plea-bargaining may help or hinder the tribunal to reach its goals. As a foundation for further discussion, the article first discusses how international law develops.
II. BACKGROUND
International law comes from a variety of sources. Much derives from international agreements or treaties. 36 Some comes from the custom of the international community, or from general principles of law, which are "common to major legal systems of the world." 38 This last type, where not also adopted from international custom or found in treaty, normally only augment international law when suitable. The common theme to all these different sources of international law is the common consent of nation states. This is the basis of all international law. 40 The Restatement ( This is not all. The practice must also be both "general and consistent," to acquire the full mantle of international customary law. 42 A wide number of important 43 states must use it (widely accepted). ** As more countries follow a practice, they develop consensus on the rule. 45 Customary law no longer requires a long period of practice. 46 Still rules practiced for long periods are better argued as customary law. Finally, these new laws become binding only when nations act out of a sense of legal duty to the custom. 47 They must believe that following the custom is their legal obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis).
Certainly the more a country consistently applies a rule (extensively practices it) within their own country, the more they confirm the rule binds them as a matter of law. are limited because they only apply to member nations. 63 Only those who have signed the charter or constitution of the international organization in question have the duty to comply.
Moving from the discussion of general international law, the paper focuses on more narrow issues. One primary purpose of this paper is to explore how plea-bargaining assists international criminal tribunals. A discussion of the purposes behind international criminal tribunals lays the footing for the paper's exploration of war crimes plea-bargains. It becomes easier for them to return to normal. This benefit to witnesses and survivors is partially a by-product of another important tribunal purpose ~ punishment.
To impose punishment upon the guilty is a major purpose of international criminal tribunals. 69 These courts punish evil. They penalize the atrocity and make sure bad acts, like murder, rape and torture have consequences. They insure that criminals do not benefit from their crimes. Clearly, punishment furthers the previously discussed aim of deterring crimes. 66 Former Chief Prosecutor for ITCY stated: "There's only one way to stop criminal conduct in any country. That's not having sentence, not even the death sentence. If would -be criminals THINK they're going to be caught and punished then they're going to think twice." Johnathan Power, Argument for a Word Criminal Court, NEW STRAITS TIMES, June 20,1998 (A western viewpoint) at 10 (Malaysia). "It is important, of course, to bring small-fish war criminals to trial -the actual perpetrators of these gruesome acts. Perhaps when the next Bosnia happens somewhere else in the world, similar small fish will think twice before engaging in such activities. But that argument applies in even grater measure to those who instigate and inflame such conflicts in the first place." Felde, supra note 4, at B9. 67 "I express the hope that this judgement will contribute to the long-term process of national reconciliation in Rwanda. For there can be no healing without peace; there can be no peace without justice; and there can be no justice without respect for human rights and the rule of law. Assigning individual responsibility for war crimes and providing punishment to remove collective guilt can be another important tribunal purpose. 73 As discussed earlier, this was a major goal of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
74
A more obscure purpose behind tribunals is collecting and preserving an accurate collective memory of the atrocities for history. 75 This goal arguably has the greatest effect on future generations. Even today evidence collected from World War II remains to remind society of the terrible nature of this war's atrocities. ,
All of these goals are interrelated in one way or another. The line separating them can stretch very thin. Yet each one has a key role to play in the establishment and functioning of international tribunals.
As this paper will demonstrate, plea-bargaining assisted the Yugoslavian tribunal in achieving these purposes. 70 Alvarez, supra note 31, at 2032. 71 Id. 72 Judgement, supra 1, at VII. Sentencing Policy of the Chamber, para 21. 73 Alvarez, supra note 31, at 2033. 74 Mat 2032. 75 Id.
III. THE PLEA-BARGAIN AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This discussion will show that contrary to ordinary expectation, plea-bargaining has become widely accepted and extensively applied. The procedure is practiced currently in for bargain. 94 With some minor changes "patteggiamento" continues to play an important role in Italian justice.
During the time Italy introduced plea-bargaining, Germany was incorporating the procedure into its criminal legal system. It is estimated that Germany began making plea agreements in the 1970s. 96 As of 1992 German plea-bargaining was common practice."
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The procedure came in spite of the fact that haggling over cases was "considered repugnant." 98 One German scholar renounced the practice, demonstrating this repugnance. 99 This author felt so strongly that he made public statements denying the practice. 100 Whether he knew it or not at the time, plea-bargaining was in full swing.
101
The practice is fully accepted today.
102
Germany's plea-bargain strikes some contrast to that of the United States. In
Germany there is no guilty plea. That means pleading guilty cannot become the central issue of the defendant and prosecutor's bargain. Still, the German system has remarkable resemblance to the United States' system. 104 In both nations, for example, the parties negotiate for an upper limit on punishment. While open plea agreements are not recognized, still Japan's use of "kiso bengi shugi" may be very similar to plea-bargaining. The prosecutor may choose not to prosecute the case for reasons that occur after the crime such as cooperation with police.
In principle, "benevolence" for cooperation seems much akin to America's pleabargaining. Plea-bargaining in America too often procures new criminal evidence. One can find striking similarity between the two systems by considering more subtle facts.
Certainly, the Japanese accused may predict or has some assurance what the prosecutor's action will be for the assistance.
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Recognizing plea negotiations in some form occur in Europe and possibly Asia, we must determine how extensive and widespread the practice may be. If plea-bargaining is extensively used within the jurisdictions practicing it, one can argue more credibly that plea-bargaining is a part of international law. 138 Id 139 Id U0 Id 141 One example of protection offered came during the Dusko Tadic trial. To protect the identity of witnesses "the public gallery was cleared the blinds were lowered, and the court launched into its first closed-door session to protect the identity of a witness, identified only as witness "P"" It later turned out to be Drazen Erdemovic. SCHARF, supra note 11, at 68,108 and 133. 142 Wat 68.
commented it was the toughest decision she had ever made. 143 She had to weigh the safety of the witnesses against a fair and just trial for the accused. 144 The Judge realized that a defendant could not adequately assist in his defense if he did not know the witnesses against him. Even with all these extraordinary protections, still fearing reprisal, some witnesses refused to testify.
For those who would testify, the prosecutors began the task of getting passports and transporting them to The Hague. Time was of the essence; everything was needed urgently and so prosecutors obtained everything at the highest cost 146 . During a trial once they found a witness, the prosecution brought them to the Tribunal within 48 hours. 147 They also provided international airfare, lodging, passports, and money for expenses while testifying.
148
From the perspective of the Erdemovic case, the tribunals totally avoided them these challenges. His agreement and guilty plea required no witness testimony. 149 The tribunal saved imposing on witnesses the pain and fear of testifying. There was no grueling cross-examination -certain to occur with live witness testimony. Without cooperation from other perpetrators, serious crimes go unpunished and criminals roam free. It is not always the small fish who are caught in the plea bargain's net either.
In the United States, prosecutors have employed the power of plea-bargaining against organized crimes leadership with great success. 156 In one of the best examples, prosecutors plea-bargained with a witness to procure the conviction of John Gotti.
During the late eighties and early nineties, John Gotti was the notorious head of the
SR
Gambino crime family in New York. He had avoided conviction in several trials. Not until the government got evidence on a member of Gotti's organization, Salvatore Gravano did they get the testimony needed to convict. 159 The government turned Gravano to a credible witness against Gotti. In the end it was the testimony of this fellow mobster that helped to finally convict John Gotti. 160 Without this witness, one would speculate a different outcome. The case grew much weaker without this witness. Bargaining in the Gotti case allowed the prosecutor to get the big fish that they otherwise would not have netted. Applying it to war crimes, plea-bargaining can yield equally stunning power and success. 155 Judgement, supra note 1, at IV Evidence para. War atrocities create intense reasons not to testify, just as in organized crime.
Usually fear motivates the witnesses' silence. 161 Prosecutors can overcome these threats with protection and enticements made during plea negotiations, just as the FBI did with recessed to allow a special Rule 61 hearing against these notorious leaders. Rule 61 is known as the "super indictment" procedure. 164 The purpose of a Rule 61 hearing is to 161 SCHARF, supra note 11, at 68. 162 McDonald Press Release, supra note 152. 163 Id. 164 SCHARF, supra note 11, at 68. assist the Tribunal in making arrests where states refused to hand over suspects.
Essentially, it allows a mini trial in absentia. 166 Rule 61's most compelling payoff comes from preserving witness testimony, documentation, physical evidence and video for future use. Political reasons also motivated the rule. 167 Holding the hearing assures victims that work is progressing in the case, and it pressures other governments to act as well.
During the Rule 61 hearing for Karadzic and Mladic, Drazen Erdemovic testified and provided important evidence. Described as the prosecution's star witness, he gave riveting testimony about the crimes. 168 How pivotal his testimony was in obtaining the indictments remains speculation. Still, plea-negotiations can be credited for Erdemovic's important testimony that factored firmly in the decision to indict these two leaders.
Besides the notoriety of the indictment itself, the Rule 61 hearing created another favorable benefit. Nations of the world were seeking peace for the Baltic region. Dayton 
V. HOW THE PLEA BARGAIN MAXIMIZES THE GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
The article begins its discussion of tribunals' goals by looking first to the objective of individual responsibility. Modern tribunals have steered primarily toward individual responsibility. 173 They punish individuals for bad conduct, not entire nations. Collective punishment is abhorred. Each war criminal convicted and individually punished asserts that individuals are responsible and not whole nations or races. In the Yugoslavian war many citizens never committed war crimes. Yet they bore guilt by national association.
The only way to remove this guilt was to punish the perpetrators. Some maintain that tribunals' further peace by removing collective guilt and inserting individual accountability.
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In the former Yugoslavia for example, the government could have prevented or at least minimized the atrocities. Instead FRY allowed these immense and wide-scale crimes. 175 In part, organized government power committed or helped them. These facts reflect badly on the nation as a whole.
When the power and resources of an entire state are bent toward atrocity, the gravity of the crime as well as the possible escape from punishment multiplies exponentially. The support, backing and resources of the state go to work. The state provides the power necessary to achieve atrocities on a broad scale. Hopefully, other countries begin to blame the FRY government itself and not its people for the barbarism.
Without plea-bargaining the goal of individual responsibility is contradicted. To prove crimes against humanity, the prosecutor must show evidence that the crimes were both widespread and pervasive. 178 The It has been suggested that plea-bargains are not a search for the truth, but instead an inducement to deception. 180 The accused in an effort to gain leniency will fabricate whatever he can to get his deal. 181 He has nothing to lose and everything to gain. They claim many criminals are habitual liars not worthy of trust.
While these accusations may ring true in ordinary criminal trials, they fall short when applied in the war crimes context. In war one does not ordinarily deal with common 183 The conduct may appear reprehensible to them as well. 184 If this is true, they will more likely feel remorse and desire to make restitution in some manner. Under these conditions they are much less likely to lie than an ordinary criminal.
The Erdemovic plea-bargain is a perfect example. He testified credibly. 185 He was not an ordinary criminal. 186 He desired to make amends for what he had done, and his personal safety was at risk. 187 Most of those who listened believed what he said was true.
The tribunal should not bar such positive results because of a possibility of false testimony. Instead, it should fashion rules to ensure truthfulness. Rather than ban, they should implement safeguards to prevent manipulation of an otherwise good system.
Deterring future war crimes is another goal of the tribunal and a good reason for using plea-bargains. Most war crimes occur in the presence or with the assistance of others. Take the killings at the farm near Pilica. The whole 10 th Sabotage Detachment participated. 188 Plea-agreements alone do not deter these crimes. However when plea agreements force convictions, the convictions themselves produce the desired chilling effect. It follows that Plea-agreements can increase the number of convictions. The more convictions, the greater the chilling effect. 189 In this indirect way, plea-bargaining deters war crimes and pushes forward the tribunal's goal of deterrence.
Plea-bargaining assists another tribunal goal by relieving the minds of anxious victims and restoring peace. A spouse may learn what happened to her loved one only through of plea-bargaining. 190 Never knowing the fate of a spouse or child tortures victims. The tribunal avoids becoming party to this evil by promoting as much openness as possible. Making agreements with accused war criminals, the tribunal opens the door to greater knowledge about the atrocities. The tribunal moves toward its goal of assisting victims.
Plea-bargaining helps restore peace in other ways as well. Since there are fewer criminals brought to justice by war crimes tribunals, each case becomes more significant.
Even one major war criminal escaping justice damages the effort to reestablish the rule of law. 191 If some perpetrators go free, surviving witnesses and victims will be left to fear further retribution. 192 Weighed against these otherwise inevitable results, plea-bargains seem as small price to pay.
Many more lives are affected by an act of genocide than by a domestic criminal act.
As Nuremberg attempted to show, the forgiveness of a nation, peace of the region or peace of the world may rest on major war criminals being brought to justice. Without plea agreements, the prosecution might lose the initial steps in this effort. The Karadzic and
Mladic indictments illustrate plea-bargaining's critical role. Plea-bargains become most critical when there are no witnesses. In these situations it may be the only solution.
Another major goal of the ITCY is removing the appearance of victor's justice. 194 Plea-bargaining lends legitimacy to this goal by using witnesses from the defeated country (same ethnicity) to provide the condemning testimony. The Erdemovic case was again a good example of this principle in action. Erdemovic's testimony was an acknowledgment from the mouth of a Serbian that the conduct was criminal. 195 It is hard to argue a trial is victor's justice when the country itself provides the condemning testimony.
Finally, plea-bargaining strengthens the confidence of the tribunal's verdicts. By making agreements, the tribunal avoids the use of questionable evidence such as hearsay to convict. Plea agreements add fairness to the trial and also help dispel the claim of victor's justice.
Arguably there are costs and drawbacks associated with using plea-bargaining in international forums. Many have been articulated already in criticism of plea-bargaining's use in domestic courts. One of the primary criticisms is that criminals avoid fair and full punishment. 196 Another is that plea-bargains gives too much control to the prosecutor. 197 This concern is linked to still another fear that plea-bargaining can be unfair to the defendant. 198 In the international trial there exists another concern about whether the prosecutors agreement improperly grants immunity. 199 Some think that when a country with jurisdiction considers the deal unjust, it may assert its own prosecution.
The fear that criminals will not receive full punishment arises when minor criminals are used to catch big perpetrators. Those making this claim argue from the perspective of the individual case. It may be true that one criminal gets a lighter sentence than he deserves, 200 but this reasoning ignores the greater good pleas bestow upon society.
The agreement aspects of plea-bargains bestow a synergistic affect. The affect is similar to that derived from economic agreements and transactions. Both parties come away with more than they would have if no agreement had been made. The defendant gains reduction of his sentence. Society obtains evidence to convict another possibly more harmful criminal. One who otherwise may have escape justice gets punished. Individually, justice may be cheated, but publicly, justice is better served.
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Once again the Erdemovic case exemplifies how plea agreements dispense fair punishment. When the final sentence was read for Erdemovic, his time in jail was less than the parties had agreed. 202 Apparently, the judges thought Erdemovic's bargained-for sentence was too harsh.
The argument that plea-bargaining leaves too much control in the hands of prosecutors does not always prove true either. In a study of El Paso County, Texas, it was noted that when judges saw prosecutors agreeing with defendants for sentences more harsh 198 Guidorizzi, supra note 23, at 753. 199 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 4, at 114. 200 Acevedo, supra note 196, at 993. 201 Welling, supra note 196, at 308. than those generally given by juries, they rejected the agreements. 203 There is also good evidence to refute the idea that defendants are not treated fairly in plea agreements. The same El Paso County study showed that guilty-plea defendants got shorter prison terms than those who contested their guilt. 204 One cannot ignore that a plea bargain system becomes unfair when sentence disparity occurs between defendants with similar crimes.
The solution, however, is to fashion limitations that eliminate these sentence disparities, not to reject plea-bargaining.
One final question still remains unresolved about plea-bargaining. That is whether plea-bargaining is internationally legitimate. Some have asked whether an international tribunal has the authority to grant partial immunity through plea agreements. Pleabargaining is a limited form of immunity in the sense that it grants sentence reduction not based upon merit. Some authors suggest that a state with jurisdiction can retain the right to prosecute and punish the crimes regardless of the tribunal agreement. 205 If the state does not recognize plea-bargaining in their domestic courts, one might question whether they will accept them in an international one. There is no satisfactory answer to this question at the present time.
206

VI. CONCLUSION
At an earlier time in history plea-bargaining may have been shunned, yet today it is becoming more and more an acceptable judicial procedure. There are many notable examples of this favorable change toward plea-bargains. Even Asia shows signs the practice may be nearing acceptance. Japan's practice of dropping cases for changes in post trial factors embodies important characteristics of a plea-bargain. Certainly, pleabargaining is becoming more common to judicial systems of the world than one might originally think.
It is still not certain whether plea-bargaining has taken on the cloak of customary international law and become "common to major legal systems of the world." One conclusion is certain though, the use of plea-bargaining at the ITCY raises its stature, and enlarges the possibility that it will be used in the future.
There are many compelling reasons for incorporating plea-bargaining as a tool in any international tribunal. Perhaps the greatest is the hope that plea-bargains will bring more war criminals to justice averting future atrocities. Many conflicts today end without clear victory and without the ability of controlling war crime scenes. Plea agreements may be the only hope of obtaining vital evidence in these situations. If the conditions in either Yugoslavia or even Iraq indicate how future wars will end, plea-agreements will assume a vital role. They will be one way the international community ensures rogue governments cannot cloak top leaders with war crime immunity.
